First Alert Smoke Alarm Recall
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of Information and Public Affairs
Washington, DC 20207
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 2, 2006 Release #06-151
Firm’s Recall Hotline: (800) 323-9005 CPSC Recall Hotline: (800) 638-2772CPSC Media Contact: (301) 504-7908
First Alert® Smoke Alarms and Combination Smoke/CO Alarms Recalled for Rapidly Draining Battery PowerWASHINGTON, D.C. - The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, in cooperation with the firm named below, today announced a voluntary recall of the following consumer product. Consumers should stop using recalled products immediately unless otherwise instructed.
Name of Product: First Alert® ONELINK™ Battery-Powered Smoke and Combination Smoke/Carbon Monoxide (CO) Alarms
Units: About 145,890 (About 52,400 were sold to consumers)
Manufacturer: BRK Brands Inc., a subsidiary of First Alert Inc., of Aurora, Ill.
Fire Hazard: These fire alarms can drain the power from batteries rapidly, causing premature low battery power. Consumers will be alerted to the low battery power and the need to replace the battery by a chirping of the unit. If the batteries on the smoke/CO alarm are not replaced before the battery power terminates, the alarm will not detect smoke in the event of a possible fire and the presence of carbon monoxide.
First Alert Incidents/Injuries: CPSC and First Alert Inc./BRK Brands Inc. have received about 329 reports of premature low battery power in these alarms. There have been no reports of injuries, incidents or alarms failing to detect smoke or carbon monoxide.
First Alert Recall Description: The recall involves ONELINK™ battery-powered smoke and combination smoke/CO alarms. “First Alert” and “ONELINK™” are printed on the front of the alarm. The model number and date code are printed on the back of the alarm. Model number SA500 or SCO500 with a date code prior to March 3, 2006 are included in this recall.
First Alert Alarms sold at: Department, home and hardware stores nationwide from June 2005 through March 2006 for between $45 and $75.
First Alert Smoke Alarm & Smoke / CO Alarms Manufactured In: Mexico
Remedy for recall First Alert Smoke Alarm: Consumers should contact First Alert Inc./BRK Brands Inc. immediately to receive a replacement alarm. Until a new alarm is received, consumers should test the batteries in the alarm weekly by pressing the “test” button. If the alarm signals a low battery alert, consumers should immediately replace the batteries. Consumers should not remove their alarms until they have received a replacement alarm.
First Alert Smoke Alarm Consumer Contact: For more information, contact First Alert Inc./BRK Brands Inc. at (800) 323-9005 between 8:30 a.m. and 6 p.m. ET Monday through Friday or visit the firm's web site at www.firstalert.com -->
Monday, July 30, 2007
Amusepark Park Ride Injuries Warning
Girl Ejected on Carnival Ride Critically Injured
NEWS from CPSC
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of Information and Public Affairs
Washington, DC 20207
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEJune 9, 2004 Release # 04-156
Wisdom/Gravitron Hotline: (970) 522-7515 CPSC Consumer Hotline: (800) 638-2772 CPSC Media Contact: (301) 504-7908
CPSC, Wisdom Industries Ltd. Announce Revised Safety Inspection Program for Gravitron Mobile Amusement Rides
WASHINGTON, D.C. – The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and Wisdom Industries Ltd., of Sterling, Colo., are announcing a revised safety inspection program for all types of Gravitron amusement rides. The Gravitron amusement ride is a whirling cylinder which uses centrifugal force to hold riders to their seats as the seats rise, giving the illusion that the floor is dropping out. The ride is also called the Starship, Old Blue, and Trip to Mars. There are approximately 190 such rides in the U.S. and Canada.On April 2, 2004, at the Miami-Dade County Fair and Exposition in Florida, a wall panel of the Gravitron ride gave way, ejecting three riders. Seven people were injured, including two bystanders who were hit by debris. Injuries included broken bones, concussions, and bruises. A 16-year-old girl ejected from the ride was critically injured. CPSC’s investigation of this incident and its work with the ride manufacturer, Wisdom Industries Ltd., resulted in a revised safety inspection program to prevent future incidents.
In brief, some of the elements of the inspection program include:
- Inspect welds and steel components for cracks or breaks.
- Inspect platform hinges for cracks or wear.
- Inspect platform hinge bolts for wear.
- Check tire air pressure.
- Measure wing sag to make sure it is level with main table.
- Inspect the underwing alignment bolts for bending and wear.
- Inspect condition of fiberglass at lower end of the panel for wear.
These new safety guidelines have been sent to all owners of Gravitron rides, state inspectors and amusement ride insurers to help improve maintenance of the rides.CPSC and Wisdom Industries announced a modification program to improve the safety of the Gravitron rides in 1992.
That program included the installation of corner pin reinforcement plates, which were in place on the ride involved in the recent incident. The revised safety inspection program should be performed in addition to the previous modification program. Wisdom Industries Ltd. can be reached at (970) 522-7515 or at their Web site: www.wisdomrides.com
MRI Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis Lawsuits
MRI Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis Lawsuits
FDA reports that a widely used MRI contrast agent is causing Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF) and Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD) The Willis Law Firm of Houston, Texas (1-800-883-9858) is currently representing a number of clients with serious complications from gadolinium including several with Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF). The MRI contrast agents, or dyes, that contain gadolinium and were used in patients who suffer from kidney failure and a disease has been linked to causing known as Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF), also called Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD). There has not been a Gadolinium recall issed to date.
MRI - Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis Links:
Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD)
Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD) Symptoms
Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD) MRI Gadolinium
FDA Requests Boxed Gadolinium Warning
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has asked manufacturers to include a new boxed warning on the product labeling of all gadolinium-based contrast agents which are used to enhance the quality of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The requested warning would state that patients with severe kidney insufficiency who receive gadolinium-based agents are at risk for developing a debilitating, and a potentially fatal disease known as nephrogenic systemic fibrosis (NSF). In addition, it would state that patients just before or just after liver transplantation, or those with chronic liver disease, are also at risk for developing NSF if they are experiencing kidney insufficiency of any severity.
"FDA has been carefully monitoring potential safety signals related to these contrast agents after receiving reports about the risk of this potentially life-threatening disease," said Steven Galson, M.D., M.P.H., director of FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. "This latest action demonstrates FDA's continuing vigilance about ensuring the safety of drug products once they enter the marketplace." NSF Paitent - Thickening of Skin & Joint ProblemsPatients with NSF develop thickening of the skin and connective tissues that inhibits their ability to move and may result in broken bones. Other organs are at risk of thickening as well. The cause of NSF is not known and there is no consistently effective treatment of this condition.FDA first notified health care professionals and the public about the gadolinium-related risks for NSF in June 2006 . Information on the risks was updated in December.Gadolinium-based contrast agents are commonly used to improve the visibility of internal structures when patients undergo an MRI. Reports have identified the development of NSF following single and multiple administrations of the gadolinium-based contrast agents. The reports have not always identified a specific agent. Omniscan was the most commonly reported agent, when a specific agent was identified, followed by Magnevist and OptiMARK.
NSF also has developed after the sequential administration of Omniscan and MultiHance and Omniscan and ProHance. Because reports incompletely describe exposure to gadolinium-based contrast agents, it is not possible to know if the extent of risks for developing NSF is the same for all agents. Patients should be screened for kidney problems prior to receiving one of these imaging agents. The recommended dose should not be exceeded and enough time should elapse to ensure that a dose has been eliminated from the body before the agent is used again. There have been no reports of NSF among patients with normal kidney function or those with mild-to-moderate kidney insufficiency.
Bayer Schering Pharma, Berlin, Germany, manufactures Magnevist; GE Healthcare, Chalfont St. Giles, U.K., is the maker of Omniscan; OptiMARK is manufactured by Mallinckrodt, Inc., Hazelwood, Mo.; and ProHance and Multihance are made by Bracco Diagnostics Inc., Princeton,
N.J
Gadolinium Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis Lawsuit - Free Case Evaluation
If you or a loved one had a MRI or a MRA, and a contrast dye or agent was used to enhance the MRI image, and you or a loved developed NFS/NFD, kidney failure or renal failure, then you may be eligible to collect money damages for your injuries and damages.
Please fill out our Free Case Evaluation Form to better help us assist you, or call us Toll Free at 1-800-883-9858.
FDA reports that a widely used MRI contrast agent is causing Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF) and Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD) The Willis Law Firm of Houston, Texas (1-800-883-9858) is currently representing a number of clients with serious complications from gadolinium including several with Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF). The MRI contrast agents, or dyes, that contain gadolinium and were used in patients who suffer from kidney failure and a disease has been linked to causing known as Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF), also called Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD). There has not been a Gadolinium recall issed to date.
MRI - Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis Links:
Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF)
Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF) Lawsuit
Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis (NSF) Symptoms
Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD)
Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD) Symptoms
Nephrogenic Fibrosing Dermopathy (NFD) MRI Gadolinium
FDA Requests Boxed Gadolinium Warning
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has asked manufacturers to include a new boxed warning on the product labeling of all gadolinium-based contrast agents which are used to enhance the quality of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The requested warning would state that patients with severe kidney insufficiency who receive gadolinium-based agents are at risk for developing a debilitating, and a potentially fatal disease known as nephrogenic systemic fibrosis (NSF). In addition, it would state that patients just before or just after liver transplantation, or those with chronic liver disease, are also at risk for developing NSF if they are experiencing kidney insufficiency of any severity.
"FDA has been carefully monitoring potential safety signals related to these contrast agents after receiving reports about the risk of this potentially life-threatening disease," said Steven Galson, M.D., M.P.H., director of FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. "This latest action demonstrates FDA's continuing vigilance about ensuring the safety of drug products once they enter the marketplace." NSF Paitent - Thickening of Skin & Joint ProblemsPatients with NSF develop thickening of the skin and connective tissues that inhibits their ability to move and may result in broken bones. Other organs are at risk of thickening as well. The cause of NSF is not known and there is no consistently effective treatment of this condition.FDA first notified health care professionals and the public about the gadolinium-related risks for NSF in June 2006 . Information on the risks was updated in December.Gadolinium-based contrast agents are commonly used to improve the visibility of internal structures when patients undergo an MRI. Reports have identified the development of NSF following single and multiple administrations of the gadolinium-based contrast agents. The reports have not always identified a specific agent. Omniscan was the most commonly reported agent, when a specific agent was identified, followed by Magnevist and OptiMARK.
NSF also has developed after the sequential administration of Omniscan and MultiHance and Omniscan and ProHance. Because reports incompletely describe exposure to gadolinium-based contrast agents, it is not possible to know if the extent of risks for developing NSF is the same for all agents. Patients should be screened for kidney problems prior to receiving one of these imaging agents. The recommended dose should not be exceeded and enough time should elapse to ensure that a dose has been eliminated from the body before the agent is used again. There have been no reports of NSF among patients with normal kidney function or those with mild-to-moderate kidney insufficiency.
Bayer Schering Pharma, Berlin, Germany, manufactures Magnevist; GE Healthcare, Chalfont St. Giles, U.K., is the maker of Omniscan; OptiMARK is manufactured by Mallinckrodt, Inc., Hazelwood, Mo.; and ProHance and Multihance are made by Bracco Diagnostics Inc., Princeton,
N.J
Gadolinium Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis Lawsuit - Free Case Evaluation
If you or a loved one had a MRI or a MRA, and a contrast dye or agent was used to enhance the MRI image, and you or a loved developed NFS/NFD, kidney failure or renal failure, then you may be eligible to collect money damages for your injuries and damages.
Please fill out our Free Case Evaluation Form to better help us assist you, or call us Toll Free at 1-800-883-9858.
Defective Ford Ignition Modules
100,000 Mile Warranty Extension: Consumers whose vehicles are on the list at the bottom of this page have the right to a free repair of a Ford TFI module that fails within 100,000 miles. Ford has issued instructions to its dealers on the warranty extension but many consumers report that dealers seem to be unaware of the extension. Consumers who encounter problems should print out the following dealer instructions and show it to their dealer to establish their right to a free repair under this warranty. Ford 100,000 Mile Extended Warranty Policy
Ford TFI Module Failure
Twenty-two million Ford vehicles made from 1983 through 1995 have defective ignition modules that may cause the vehicle to stall and die on the highway at any time. Failure at highway speeds can cause the driver to lose control or even result in a stalled vehicle being hit by a truck. Some models had failure rates as high as 90%. According to Ford, two-thirds of the failures were of the "die on the road" type.
The models affected have ignition modules mounted on the distributor and are listed below. When its temperature goes above 257 degrees Fahrenheit, the module is likely to cut out and cause the vehicle to die on the road. When the vehicle cools down, it can be restarted and will run until it again exceeds the design temperature. This is a hard problem to diagnose because by the time the vehicle gets towed to the dealer or sits in the shop waiting for repair, it has cooled down and no cause can be found for the stalling.
During the 1980's, NHTSA conducted five investigations into stalling in Ford vehicles. During those investigations, Ford withheld documents from NHTSA that would have shown a common cause of stalling -- failure of the Thick Film Ignition (TFI) module mounted on the distributor when its temperature rises above 125 C and cuts out, causing the vehicle to stall on the highway. There are over 10 million vehicles still on American roads today that suffer from the same readily-correctable design defect that can cause the engine to stop abruptly and unexpectedly, at any time and at any speed, leaving the driver without power-assisted steering or brakes and the vehicle disabled. Vehicles with the distributor mounted TFI module have a 9% higher fatal crash rate than those with a different module system.
Ford Motor Company has known about this problem since it began, yet concealed it from consumers and government regulators for well over a decade. Just as in Firestone tires on Ford Explorers, a prime instrument in Ford's cover up was secrecy agreements in product liability lawsuits. Over 900 product liability lawsuits have been filed against Ford on these vehicles with protective orders and confidential settlement agreements entered in many.
In a landmark decision on August 29,2000, in Howard v. Ford Motor Co., (Case No. 763785-2, Alameda County Superior Court, California State Judge Michael Ballachey announced he would order the recall of 1.8 million 1983-95 Ford vehicles in California with defective ignition modules that fail and cause dangerous stalls on highways. Judge Ballachey's ruling is the first court order of a recall in the United States outside NHTSA. In a stinging indictment of Ford Motor Co., Judge Ballachey found:
Ford withheld responsive information from NHTSA that it was obligated to provide. [p.5] It was not for Ford to decide what "safety" meant, or what levels of warranty returns obligated it to report to the EPA. Ford's responsibility was to respond to legitimate government inquiries with appropriate information so that an independent evaluation could determine the presence or absence of a problem. [p.6] Ford failed to meet its obligations to report safety related defect information to relevant governmental agencies and, by so doing concealed vital information related to vehicle safety from the consuming public. This fraudulent concealment. . . constitutes a violation of both Civil Code sections 1770(a)(5) and (7). [p.8]
The problem is caused by the thick film ignition ("TFI") modules, a key ignition-system component that Ford installed in more than 22 million vehicles it manufactured and sold in the 1983 through 1995 mode years. The TFI module regulates the electrical current that fires the air-fuel mixture in each of the engine's cylinders. To reduce costs, Ford installed the TFI on the distributor, one of the hottest locations under the hood. But because the TFI module is sensitive to heat, its mounting location creates an inordinate propensity for the TFI module to fail due to thermal stress. Making the problem even more insidious is its phantom nature. A TFI module can fail on an intermittent basis when hot, then function again when the engine cools, without leaving a trace of physical evidence that the TFI module had failed.
Rather than bearing the expense of moving the TFI module to a cooler location away from the engine—a solution that Ford engineers recommended to management for years—Ford decided to employ a less costly solution: to leave the module on the distributor, but make it last long enough to function during the warranty period, thereby forcing consumers to bear the cost of post-warranty failures that Ford knew would continue to occur in large numbers. As a result, over 13 million replacement TFI modules (which are designed to last for the life of the vehicle without maintenance or repair) have been sold to consumers at a cost of nearly $2 billion.
Despite an extraordinary number of complaints from consumers, Ford managed to conceal the TFI problem from government regulators. From 1983 through 1989 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) conducted five separate investigations into stalling complaints by Ford customers. In response to these investigations, Ford concealed what it knew about the TFI problem and persuaded NHTSA to close each investigation without taking action. As a result of the class action, NHTSA opened an investigation in 1997, in which it concluded that Ford had withheld key documents during earlier investigations. By then, the 8-year statute of limitations on NHTSA's authority to order a recall had expired, preventing NHTSA from taking any meaningful enforcement action.
Ford continues to deny that TFI-related stalling causes a safety risk. According to Ford, TFI failure causes the vehicle to buck, hesitate, and experience other "driveability" symptoms that provide a warning that the TFI module is about to fail. But Ford took the exact opposite position when it attempted to excuse its failure to report to the Environmental Protection Agency and the California Air Resources Board over 1 million TFI modules (which EPA and CARB deem "emissions-related" components) that were returned under warranty. In direct contradiction to Ford's contention that TFI module failure does not pose a safety risk because TFI-induced bucking and hesitation provides plenty of warning, Ford claimed that TFI module failure cannot affect air quality because such failure occurs suddenly and without warning.
Having concealed the true nature and scope of the TFI defect from NHTSA, from EPA, and other regulatory agencies, Ford then used its bargaining power to keep secret the information about the TFI defect in the only other context in which the truth could air: private civil litigation. Given the intermittent, phantom nature of the TFI problem, few people ever discovered that TFI failure was the cause of their injuries, and even fewer sued because of it. When personal-injury plaintiffs did discover what Ford knew about the problem, Ford paid millions of dollars in settlements requiring lawyers to return hot documents, remain silent about what they learned from those documents, and refrain from assisting others in similar litigation against Ford. Just as in Firestone tires on Ford Explorers, the TFI product liability cases against Ford involve tragic injuries. In Phan v Budget Rent a Car & Ford Motor Co., there were two deaths, one quadriplegic and four other injuries when a 1990 Mercury Sable stalled at highway speeds.
In the recall of Ford Explorers for Firestone tire tread separations, then Ford President & CEO Jacques Nasser repeatedly told the American public that "Your Safety Is Our Top Priority." Yet in Howard v Ford Motor Co., Ford told the court it didn't know what safety was. As Judge Ballachey observed after hearing the testimony of top executive including its former CEO Harold Poling, its former Vice Chairman Louis Ross and Vice Presidents Robert Transou and Helen Petrauskus among others:
Ford's dissimulation reached its nadir in the testimony of Bob Wheaton, Ford's witness designated as most knowledgeable about safety issues when he insisted that "safe is too subjective" and denied knowledge of any "written definition of what safe is within Ford Motor Company." Other Ford executives were similarly evasive when pressed on the question of whether or not a failed TFI module, under any circumstances, presented an unreasonable risk of safety.
The following vehicles have distributor-mounted TFI modules:
1984-85 Escort/Lynx (1.6L) 1984-86 Escort/EXP TC (1.6L) 1986-88 Escort/Lynx (1.9L) 1985-90 Escort/Lynx HO (1.9L) 1984-90 Tempo/Topaz (2.3L) 1985-94 Tempo/Topaz HSC (2.3L) 1984-89 Mustang/Capri (2.3L) 1984-86 Mustang SVO TC (2.3L) 1984-86 Mustang/Capri/Cougar TC (2.3L) 1984-85 Mustang/Capri (3.8L) 1984-94 Mustang/Capri HO (5.0L) 1984-88 Thunderbird/Cougar TC (2.3L) 1984-87 Thunderbird/Cougar (3.8L) 1984-91 Thunderbird/Cougar (5.0L) 1986-87 Taurus/Sable (2.5L) 1986-95 Taurus/Sable (3.0L) 1986-87 Taurus/Sable (3.8L) 1986-87 Continental (3.8L) 1984-92 Mark VII (5.0L) 1984-89 Town Car (5.0L) 1984-85 LTD/Marquis (2.3L) 1984-86 LTD/Marquis (3.8L) 1984-94 LTD/Marquis (5.0L) 1985-87 Aerostar (2.3L) 1986-90 Aerostar (3.0L) 1984-89 Ranger (2.3L) 1986-91 Ranger/Bronco II (2.9L) 1984-90 Bronco (4.9L) 1984-91 Bronco (5.0L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 Bronco (5.8L) 1984-91 F-150 Pickup (4.9L) 1984-91 F-150 Pickup (5.0L) 1984-91 F-250 Pickup (4.9L) 1984-91 F-250 Pickup (5.0L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 F-150 Pickup (5.8L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 F-250 Pickup (5.8L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 F-350 Pickup (5.8L) 1984-91 E-150 Van (4.9L) 1984-91 E-150 Van (5.0L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 E-150 Van (5.8L)
Ford TFI Module Failure
Twenty-two million Ford vehicles made from 1983 through 1995 have defective ignition modules that may cause the vehicle to stall and die on the highway at any time. Failure at highway speeds can cause the driver to lose control or even result in a stalled vehicle being hit by a truck. Some models had failure rates as high as 90%. According to Ford, two-thirds of the failures were of the "die on the road" type.
The models affected have ignition modules mounted on the distributor and are listed below. When its temperature goes above 257 degrees Fahrenheit, the module is likely to cut out and cause the vehicle to die on the road. When the vehicle cools down, it can be restarted and will run until it again exceeds the design temperature. This is a hard problem to diagnose because by the time the vehicle gets towed to the dealer or sits in the shop waiting for repair, it has cooled down and no cause can be found for the stalling.
During the 1980's, NHTSA conducted five investigations into stalling in Ford vehicles. During those investigations, Ford withheld documents from NHTSA that would have shown a common cause of stalling -- failure of the Thick Film Ignition (TFI) module mounted on the distributor when its temperature rises above 125 C and cuts out, causing the vehicle to stall on the highway. There are over 10 million vehicles still on American roads today that suffer from the same readily-correctable design defect that can cause the engine to stop abruptly and unexpectedly, at any time and at any speed, leaving the driver without power-assisted steering or brakes and the vehicle disabled. Vehicles with the distributor mounted TFI module have a 9% higher fatal crash rate than those with a different module system.
Ford Motor Company has known about this problem since it began, yet concealed it from consumers and government regulators for well over a decade. Just as in Firestone tires on Ford Explorers, a prime instrument in Ford's cover up was secrecy agreements in product liability lawsuits. Over 900 product liability lawsuits have been filed against Ford on these vehicles with protective orders and confidential settlement agreements entered in many.
In a landmark decision on August 29,2000, in Howard v. Ford Motor Co., (Case No. 763785-2, Alameda County Superior Court, California State Judge Michael Ballachey announced he would order the recall of 1.8 million 1983-95 Ford vehicles in California with defective ignition modules that fail and cause dangerous stalls on highways. Judge Ballachey's ruling is the first court order of a recall in the United States outside NHTSA. In a stinging indictment of Ford Motor Co., Judge Ballachey found:
Ford withheld responsive information from NHTSA that it was obligated to provide. [p.5] It was not for Ford to decide what "safety" meant, or what levels of warranty returns obligated it to report to the EPA. Ford's responsibility was to respond to legitimate government inquiries with appropriate information so that an independent evaluation could determine the presence or absence of a problem. [p.6] Ford failed to meet its obligations to report safety related defect information to relevant governmental agencies and, by so doing concealed vital information related to vehicle safety from the consuming public. This fraudulent concealment. . . constitutes a violation of both Civil Code sections 1770(a)(5) and (7). [p.8]
The problem is caused by the thick film ignition ("TFI") modules, a key ignition-system component that Ford installed in more than 22 million vehicles it manufactured and sold in the 1983 through 1995 mode years. The TFI module regulates the electrical current that fires the air-fuel mixture in each of the engine's cylinders. To reduce costs, Ford installed the TFI on the distributor, one of the hottest locations under the hood. But because the TFI module is sensitive to heat, its mounting location creates an inordinate propensity for the TFI module to fail due to thermal stress. Making the problem even more insidious is its phantom nature. A TFI module can fail on an intermittent basis when hot, then function again when the engine cools, without leaving a trace of physical evidence that the TFI module had failed.
Rather than bearing the expense of moving the TFI module to a cooler location away from the engine—a solution that Ford engineers recommended to management for years—Ford decided to employ a less costly solution: to leave the module on the distributor, but make it last long enough to function during the warranty period, thereby forcing consumers to bear the cost of post-warranty failures that Ford knew would continue to occur in large numbers. As a result, over 13 million replacement TFI modules (which are designed to last for the life of the vehicle without maintenance or repair) have been sold to consumers at a cost of nearly $2 billion.
Despite an extraordinary number of complaints from consumers, Ford managed to conceal the TFI problem from government regulators. From 1983 through 1989 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) conducted five separate investigations into stalling complaints by Ford customers. In response to these investigations, Ford concealed what it knew about the TFI problem and persuaded NHTSA to close each investigation without taking action. As a result of the class action, NHTSA opened an investigation in 1997, in which it concluded that Ford had withheld key documents during earlier investigations. By then, the 8-year statute of limitations on NHTSA's authority to order a recall had expired, preventing NHTSA from taking any meaningful enforcement action.
Ford continues to deny that TFI-related stalling causes a safety risk. According to Ford, TFI failure causes the vehicle to buck, hesitate, and experience other "driveability" symptoms that provide a warning that the TFI module is about to fail. But Ford took the exact opposite position when it attempted to excuse its failure to report to the Environmental Protection Agency and the California Air Resources Board over 1 million TFI modules (which EPA and CARB deem "emissions-related" components) that were returned under warranty. In direct contradiction to Ford's contention that TFI module failure does not pose a safety risk because TFI-induced bucking and hesitation provides plenty of warning, Ford claimed that TFI module failure cannot affect air quality because such failure occurs suddenly and without warning.
Having concealed the true nature and scope of the TFI defect from NHTSA, from EPA, and other regulatory agencies, Ford then used its bargaining power to keep secret the information about the TFI defect in the only other context in which the truth could air: private civil litigation. Given the intermittent, phantom nature of the TFI problem, few people ever discovered that TFI failure was the cause of their injuries, and even fewer sued because of it. When personal-injury plaintiffs did discover what Ford knew about the problem, Ford paid millions of dollars in settlements requiring lawyers to return hot documents, remain silent about what they learned from those documents, and refrain from assisting others in similar litigation against Ford. Just as in Firestone tires on Ford Explorers, the TFI product liability cases against Ford involve tragic injuries. In Phan v Budget Rent a Car & Ford Motor Co., there were two deaths, one quadriplegic and four other injuries when a 1990 Mercury Sable stalled at highway speeds.
In the recall of Ford Explorers for Firestone tire tread separations, then Ford President & CEO Jacques Nasser repeatedly told the American public that "Your Safety Is Our Top Priority." Yet in Howard v Ford Motor Co., Ford told the court it didn't know what safety was. As Judge Ballachey observed after hearing the testimony of top executive including its former CEO Harold Poling, its former Vice Chairman Louis Ross and Vice Presidents Robert Transou and Helen Petrauskus among others:
Ford's dissimulation reached its nadir in the testimony of Bob Wheaton, Ford's witness designated as most knowledgeable about safety issues when he insisted that "safe is too subjective" and denied knowledge of any "written definition of what safe is within Ford Motor Company." Other Ford executives were similarly evasive when pressed on the question of whether or not a failed TFI module, under any circumstances, presented an unreasonable risk of safety.
The following vehicles have distributor-mounted TFI modules:
1984-85 Escort/Lynx (1.6L) 1984-86 Escort/EXP TC (1.6L) 1986-88 Escort/Lynx (1.9L) 1985-90 Escort/Lynx HO (1.9L) 1984-90 Tempo/Topaz (2.3L) 1985-94 Tempo/Topaz HSC (2.3L) 1984-89 Mustang/Capri (2.3L) 1984-86 Mustang SVO TC (2.3L) 1984-86 Mustang/Capri/Cougar TC (2.3L) 1984-85 Mustang/Capri (3.8L) 1984-94 Mustang/Capri HO (5.0L) 1984-88 Thunderbird/Cougar TC (2.3L) 1984-87 Thunderbird/Cougar (3.8L) 1984-91 Thunderbird/Cougar (5.0L) 1986-87 Taurus/Sable (2.5L) 1986-95 Taurus/Sable (3.0L) 1986-87 Taurus/Sable (3.8L) 1986-87 Continental (3.8L) 1984-92 Mark VII (5.0L) 1984-89 Town Car (5.0L) 1984-85 LTD/Marquis (2.3L) 1984-86 LTD/Marquis (3.8L) 1984-94 LTD/Marquis (5.0L) 1985-87 Aerostar (2.3L) 1986-90 Aerostar (3.0L) 1984-89 Ranger (2.3L) 1986-91 Ranger/Bronco II (2.9L) 1984-90 Bronco (4.9L) 1984-91 Bronco (5.0L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 Bronco (5.8L) 1984-91 F-150 Pickup (4.9L) 1984-91 F-150 Pickup (5.0L) 1984-91 F-250 Pickup (4.9L) 1984-91 F-250 Pickup (5.0L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 F-150 Pickup (5.8L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 F-250 Pickup (5.8L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 F-350 Pickup (5.8L) 1984-91 E-150 Van (4.9L) 1984-91 E-150 Van (5.0L) 1984-85 & 1988-91 E-150 Van (5.8L)
Saturday, July 28, 2007
ReNu MoistureLoc- Fungal Keratitis Infections
ReNu with MoistureLoc
"ReNu with MoistureLoc" is a brand of contact lens solution manufactured by Bausch & Lomb. On April 13, 2006, Bausch & Lomb announced that it is withdrawing all U.S.-manufactured ReNu with MoistureLoc products and is recommending that consumers stop using ReNu with MoistureLoc immediately, because of a possible link between use of Renu with MoistureLoc and the development of serious fungal eye infections which may result in blindness if left untreated. Talk to a Lawyer about a ReNu Moisture Loc Keratitis Lawsuit.
Federal Health Agency Action
In addition to the market withdrawal of ReNu with MoistureLoc by the manufacturer, both the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) continue to investigate reports of fungal infection ("fusarium keratitis") in contact lens wearers, in an effort to determine all contributing factors and/or products that place contact lens wearers at increased risk. On April 21, 2006 the FDA issued an updated Public Health Notification on the recent rise in reports of serious fungal eye infections in contact lens users, noting that some infections are serious enough to cause vision loss. The FDA recommended that healthcare providers advise patients to stop using Bausch & Lomb's "ReNu with MoistureLoc" contact lens solution products immediately, and instructed consumers to stop using Bausch & Lomb "ReNu with MoistureLoc" products and discard all remaining MoistureLoc solution, including partially used or opened bottles.
ReNu - Fungal Keratitis
On April 10, 2006, CDC stated that it received reports of 109 cases of suspected fungal keratitis in 17 different states. Although the majority of case patients have yet to be interviewed, complete data are available for 30 of them. Twenty-eight of the 30 wore soft contact lenses. Preliminary information obtained by CDC from patient interviews indicates that 26 of these patients remembered which products they used, and that all 26 Among the 26 patients for whom complete data were available, all 26 reported using a Bausch & Lomb ReNu brand contact lens solution in the month prior to the onset of infection. FDA and CDC investigation into these cases is continuing.
"ReNu with MoistureLoc" is a brand of contact lens solution manufactured by Bausch & Lomb. On April 13, 2006, Bausch & Lomb announced that it is withdrawing all U.S.-manufactured ReNu with MoistureLoc products and is recommending that consumers stop using ReNu with MoistureLoc immediately, because of a possible link between use of Renu with MoistureLoc and the development of serious fungal eye infections which may result in blindness if left untreated. Talk to a Lawyer about a ReNu Moisture Loc Keratitis Lawsuit.
Federal Health Agency Action
In addition to the market withdrawal of ReNu with MoistureLoc by the manufacturer, both the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) continue to investigate reports of fungal infection ("fusarium keratitis") in contact lens wearers, in an effort to determine all contributing factors and/or products that place contact lens wearers at increased risk. On April 21, 2006 the FDA issued an updated Public Health Notification on the recent rise in reports of serious fungal eye infections in contact lens users, noting that some infections are serious enough to cause vision loss. The FDA recommended that healthcare providers advise patients to stop using Bausch & Lomb's "ReNu with MoistureLoc" contact lens solution products immediately, and instructed consumers to stop using Bausch & Lomb "ReNu with MoistureLoc" products and discard all remaining MoistureLoc solution, including partially used or opened bottles.
ReNu - Fungal Keratitis
On April 10, 2006, CDC stated that it received reports of 109 cases of suspected fungal keratitis in 17 different states. Although the majority of case patients have yet to be interviewed, complete data are available for 30 of them. Twenty-eight of the 30 wore soft contact lenses. Preliminary information obtained by CDC from patient interviews indicates that 26 of these patients remembered which products they used, and that all 26 Among the 26 patients for whom complete data were available, all 26 reported using a Bausch & Lomb ReNu brand contact lens solution in the month prior to the onset of infection. FDA and CDC investigation into these cases is continuing.
Zyprexa Class Action Lawsuit
Zyprexa Class Action Lawsuit Settlement
ZYPREXA ALERT> Zyprexa Diabetes or Diabetic Ketoacidosis Class Action Lawsuits
A number of Zyprexa Class action lawsuits have been filed over the last few years. If you or a loved one have been diagnosed with diabetes, pancreatitis or diabetic ketoacidosis after taking Zyprexa, you should consider receiving a free legal evaluation of a potential Zyprexa claim or lawsuit. There is no charge for the Zyprexa lawsuit consultation. You may be entitled to a Zyprexa lawsuit or part of a Zypreza Class Action lawsuit and zyprexa settlment already on file. Call a Zyprexa Lawyer at 1-800-883-9858 to discuss if a class action lawsuit is best for you.
Zyprexa, Pancreatitis & Diabetes
According to medical experts, Zyprexa may be linked to causing diabetes, pancreatitis, hyperglycemia (elevated blood sugar levels), and a potentially fatal complication of diabetes called diabetic ketoacidosis in some patients. In September 2003, Eli Lilly sent a Dear Doctor Letter regarding Zyprexa and the FDA issued a request to the manufacturer of the very popular antipsychotic medication Zyprexa, used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, to add a warning to the drug's label of a possible link between Zyprexa and diabetes. See FDA Zyprexa Warning
Zyprexa Class Action Lawsuits
If you or a loved one have been diagnosed with diabetes, pancreatitis or diabetic ketoacidosis after taking Zyprexa, you should consider receiving a free legal evaluation of a potential Zyprexa claim or class action lawsuit. There is no charge for the Zyprexa class action lawsuit consultation. We work on a contingency fee basis. This means that if you do not receive a financial benefit from your case, there is no charge for our services. Call and speak with a Zyprexa lawyer about a Zyprexa diabetes class action lawsuit or Zyprexa diabetic ketoacidosis injury lawsuit and the current Zyprexa class action lawsuit and Zyprexa lawsuit settlement.
Call a Zyprexa Class Action Lawsuit Attorney at 1-800-883-9858
ZYPREXA ALERT> Zyprexa Diabetes or Diabetic Ketoacidosis Class Action Lawsuits
A number of Zyprexa Class action lawsuits have been filed over the last few years. If you or a loved one have been diagnosed with diabetes, pancreatitis or diabetic ketoacidosis after taking Zyprexa, you should consider receiving a free legal evaluation of a potential Zyprexa claim or lawsuit. There is no charge for the Zyprexa lawsuit consultation. You may be entitled to a Zyprexa lawsuit or part of a Zypreza Class Action lawsuit and zyprexa settlment already on file. Call a Zyprexa Lawyer at 1-800-883-9858 to discuss if a class action lawsuit is best for you.
Zyprexa, Pancreatitis & Diabetes
According to medical experts, Zyprexa may be linked to causing diabetes, pancreatitis, hyperglycemia (elevated blood sugar levels), and a potentially fatal complication of diabetes called diabetic ketoacidosis in some patients. In September 2003, Eli Lilly sent a Dear Doctor Letter regarding Zyprexa and the FDA issued a request to the manufacturer of the very popular antipsychotic medication Zyprexa, used to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, to add a warning to the drug's label of a possible link between Zyprexa and diabetes. See FDA Zyprexa Warning
Zyprexa Class Action Lawsuits
If you or a loved one have been diagnosed with diabetes, pancreatitis or diabetic ketoacidosis after taking Zyprexa, you should consider receiving a free legal evaluation of a potential Zyprexa claim or class action lawsuit. There is no charge for the Zyprexa class action lawsuit consultation. We work on a contingency fee basis. This means that if you do not receive a financial benefit from your case, there is no charge for our services. Call and speak with a Zyprexa lawyer about a Zyprexa diabetes class action lawsuit or Zyprexa diabetic ketoacidosis injury lawsuit and the current Zyprexa class action lawsuit and Zyprexa lawsuit settlement.
Call a Zyprexa Class Action Lawsuit Attorney at 1-800-883-9858
Firestone Tire Recall - Class Action Lawsuit
Firestone Tire Class Action Settled
March 16, 2003 A Texas state court judge has approved a $149-million settlement involving 30 class-action lawsuits filed on behalf of Firestone tire owners. The settlement could affect an estimated 15 million drivers and involve about 60 million tires.
State District Judge Donald Floyd's acceptance of the settlement closes another chapter in the 2000 recall of 14.4 million Firestone tires following fatal rollovers by Ford Explorers and other vehicles. ( See: Ford Explorer Rollover )
The lawsuits include those filed by Firestone ATX, ATX II and Wilderness AT customers whose tires were among those investigated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 2000. The Firestone tire tread separation problem caused Bridgestone Firestone to recall millions of the Firestone tires due to tire tread separation, detreading tires and delamination problems which was blamed for numerous wrecks, accidents and rollovers.
Firestone will pay about $70 million to replace tires, $41 million to upgrade materials in some tires, $15.5 million on a consumer education and awareness campaign and $19 million for lawyers fees. The company also has paid $3.5 million to notify class members of the settlement plan.
The 45 individual plaintiffs named in the suits could each receive up to $2,500. Those who are not named but who owned one of 22 brands of Bridgestone/Firestone tires between 1991 and 2001 qualify to have their tires replaced.
If you have been involved in a Tire de)tread and/or Rollover Accident contact a Board Certified Personal Injury Trial Lawyer certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.
Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 for a Free Case Consultation
March 16, 2003 A Texas state court judge has approved a $149-million settlement involving 30 class-action lawsuits filed on behalf of Firestone tire owners. The settlement could affect an estimated 15 million drivers and involve about 60 million tires.
State District Judge Donald Floyd's acceptance of the settlement closes another chapter in the 2000 recall of 14.4 million Firestone tires following fatal rollovers by Ford Explorers and other vehicles. ( See: Ford Explorer Rollover )
The lawsuits include those filed by Firestone ATX, ATX II and Wilderness AT customers whose tires were among those investigated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 2000. The Firestone tire tread separation problem caused Bridgestone Firestone to recall millions of the Firestone tires due to tire tread separation, detreading tires and delamination problems which was blamed for numerous wrecks, accidents and rollovers.
Firestone will pay about $70 million to replace tires, $41 million to upgrade materials in some tires, $15.5 million on a consumer education and awareness campaign and $19 million for lawyers fees. The company also has paid $3.5 million to notify class members of the settlement plan.
The 45 individual plaintiffs named in the suits could each receive up to $2,500. Those who are not named but who owned one of 22 brands of Bridgestone/Firestone tires between 1991 and 2001 qualify to have their tires replaced.
If you have been involved in a Tire de)tread and/or Rollover Accident contact a Board Certified Personal Injury Trial Lawyer certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization.
Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 for a Free Case Consultation
Class Action Lawsuit
Class Action Lawsuits
Class action lawsuits may be brought in federal court if the claim arises under federal law, or if all named representative members of the potential plaintiff class are from a different state than the defendant. Nationwide plaintiff classes are possible, but such suits must have a commonality of issues across state lines. This may be difficult if the civil law in the various states have significant differences. Large class actions brought in federal court frequently are consolidated for pre-trail purposes through the device of multi-district litigation (MDL). It is also possible to bring class action lawsuits under state law, and in some cases the court may extend its jurisdiction to all the members of the class, including out of state (or even internationally) as the key element is the jurisdiction that the court has over the defendant.
Class Action Lawsuit - Federal Court
Typically, federal courts are thought to be more favorable for defendants, and state courts more favorable for plaintiffs. Many class action cases are filed initially in state court. The defendant will frequently try to remove the case to federal court. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 increases defendants' ability to remove state cases to federal court. It should be noted, however, that the Class Action Fairness Act contains carve-outs for, inter alia, shareholder class action lawsuits covered by the PSLRA and those concerning internal corporate governance issues (the latter typically being brought as shareholder derivative actions in the state courts of Delaware, the state of incorporation of most large corporations).[2]
Filing a Class Action Lawsuit
The procedure for filing a class action is to file suit with one or several named plaintiffs on behalf of a proposed class. The proposed class must consist of a group of individuals or business entities that have suffered a common injury or injuries. Typically these cases result from an action on the part of a business or a particular product defect or policy that applied to all proposed class members in a uniform manner. After the complaint is filed, the plaintiff must file a motion to have the class certified. In some cases class certification may require additional discovery in order to determine if the proposed class meets the standard for class certification.
Upon the motion to certify the class, the defendants may object to whether the issues are appropriately handled as a class action, to whether the named plaintiffs are sufficiently representative of the class, and to their relationship with the law firm or firms handling the case. The court will also examine the ability of the firm to prosecute the claim for the plaintiffs, and their resources for dealing with class actions.
Notice to Injured Parties in Class Action Lawsuit
Due process requires in most cases that notice describing the class action be sent, published, or broadcast to class members. As part of this notice procedure, there may have to be several notices, first a notice giving class members the opportunity to opt out of the class, i.e. if individuals wish to proceed with their own litigation they are entitled to do so, only to the extent that they give timely notice to the class counsel or the court that they are opting out. Second, if there is a settlement proposal, the court will usually direct the class counsel to send a settlement notice to all the members of the certified class, informing them of the details of the proposed settlement.
Requirements for Filing a Class Action Lawsuit
In federal civil procedure law, which has generally been accepted by most states (through adoption of state civil procedure rules paralleling the federal rules), the class action must have certain definite characteristics: (1) the class must be so large as to make individual suits impractical, (2) there must be legal or factual claims in common (3) the claims or defenses must be typical of the plaintiffs or defendants, and (4) the representative parties must adequately protect the interests of the class. In many cases, the party seeking certification must also show (5) that common issues between the class and the defendants will predominate the proceedings, as opposed to individual fact-specific conflicts between class members and the defendants and (6) that the class action, instead of individual litigation, is a superior vehicle for resolution of the disputes at hand
Class Action Lawsuit Lawyer
Class action lawsuits may be brought in federal court if the claim arises under federal law, or if all named representative members of the potential plaintiff class are from a different state than the defendant. Nationwide plaintiff classes are possible, but such suits must have a commonality of issues across state lines. This may be difficult if the civil law in the various states have significant differences. Large class actions brought in federal court frequently are consolidated for pre-trail purposes through the device of multi-district litigation (MDL). It is also possible to bring class action lawsuits under state law, and in some cases the court may extend its jurisdiction to all the members of the class, including out of state (or even internationally) as the key element is the jurisdiction that the court has over the defendant.
Class Action Lawsuit - Federal Court
Typically, federal courts are thought to be more favorable for defendants, and state courts more favorable for plaintiffs. Many class action cases are filed initially in state court. The defendant will frequently try to remove the case to federal court. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 increases defendants' ability to remove state cases to federal court. It should be noted, however, that the Class Action Fairness Act contains carve-outs for, inter alia, shareholder class action lawsuits covered by the PSLRA and those concerning internal corporate governance issues (the latter typically being brought as shareholder derivative actions in the state courts of Delaware, the state of incorporation of most large corporations).[2]
Filing a Class Action Lawsuit
The procedure for filing a class action is to file suit with one or several named plaintiffs on behalf of a proposed class. The proposed class must consist of a group of individuals or business entities that have suffered a common injury or injuries. Typically these cases result from an action on the part of a business or a particular product defect or policy that applied to all proposed class members in a uniform manner. After the complaint is filed, the plaintiff must file a motion to have the class certified. In some cases class certification may require additional discovery in order to determine if the proposed class meets the standard for class certification.
Upon the motion to certify the class, the defendants may object to whether the issues are appropriately handled as a class action, to whether the named plaintiffs are sufficiently representative of the class, and to their relationship with the law firm or firms handling the case. The court will also examine the ability of the firm to prosecute the claim for the plaintiffs, and their resources for dealing with class actions.
Notice to Injured Parties in Class Action Lawsuit
Due process requires in most cases that notice describing the class action be sent, published, or broadcast to class members. As part of this notice procedure, there may have to be several notices, first a notice giving class members the opportunity to opt out of the class, i.e. if individuals wish to proceed with their own litigation they are entitled to do so, only to the extent that they give timely notice to the class counsel or the court that they are opting out. Second, if there is a settlement proposal, the court will usually direct the class counsel to send a settlement notice to all the members of the certified class, informing them of the details of the proposed settlement.
Requirements for Filing a Class Action Lawsuit
In federal civil procedure law, which has generally been accepted by most states (through adoption of state civil procedure rules paralleling the federal rules), the class action must have certain definite characteristics: (1) the class must be so large as to make individual suits impractical, (2) there must be legal or factual claims in common (3) the claims or defenses must be typical of the plaintiffs or defendants, and (4) the representative parties must adequately protect the interests of the class. In many cases, the party seeking certification must also show (5) that common issues between the class and the defendants will predominate the proceedings, as opposed to individual fact-specific conflicts between class members and the defendants and (6) that the class action, instead of individual litigation, is a superior vehicle for resolution of the disputes at hand
Class Action Lawsuit Lawyer
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